

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 USUN N 02280 01 OF 04 060033Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----079598 060036Z /73

O 060015Z JUN 78

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1793

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAKAR

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 02280

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PDEV, MOPS, MARR, CG, BE, FR

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION OF ZAIRE WITH BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

- SIMONET

SUMMARY: IN CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR YOUNG JUNE 2, BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SIMONET CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO MOBUTU FOR THE MOMENT, BUT HE MUST BE FORCED TO REFORM. SIMONET EXPECTED LITTLE TO COME OF THE PARIS MEETING, BUT HE HOPED TO SEND UNMISTAKABLE SIGNALS TO MOBUTU THAT HE MUST ACCEPT OUTSIDE HELP AND HE MUST FUNDAMENTALLY REFORM HIS REGIME. HE AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ANGOLAN FACET OF THE PROBLEM AND INDICATED THAT BELGIUM WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK ON IT. HE URGED CONTINUED U.S. EFFORTS FOR SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE STABILIZATION OF THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA. SIMO-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 USUN N 02280 01 OF 04 060033Z

NET EXPRESSED INTEREST IN A LONGER-TERM EFFORT TO TURN AFRICANS THROUGH THE OAU TO THE UN FOR PEACEKEEPING REQUIREMENTS AND URGED THAT THE U.S. WORK ON THIS IDEA WITH NIGERIA, AS THE KEY TO SUCCESS. END SUMMARY.

1. AMBASSADOR YOUNG, ACCOMPANIED BY POLMIN, CALLED ON BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SIMONET AT THE BELGIAN MISSION

JUNE 2. THE FORTY-FIVE MINUTE CONVERSATION CENTERED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THE PRESENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN ZAIRE. SIMONET OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY ASKING YOUNG FOR HIS VIEWS ON ZAIRE.

2. YOUNG SAID THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING A UNITED ZAIRE WITH A STABLE GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVELY WORKING ON THE MANY INTERNAL PROBLEMS. HE SAID THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO MAKE A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARD ACHIEVING THESE GOALS, AND U.S. BANKS ARE ALREADY FIRMLY COMMITTED. HE RECALLED A NUMBER OF HIS ZAIRIAN ACQUAINTANCES WHO ARE COMPETENT PEOPLE, BUT WHO HAD TO LEAVE ZAIRE BECAUSE THEY WERE PERCEIVED TO BE A THREAT TO MOBUTU. HE SAID HE THINKS A LARGE PART OF THE PROBLEM IS TO FIND A TEMPORARY CIVIL SERVICE THAT CAN BE INTRODUCED INTO ZAIRE TO COPE WITH THE MANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS. HE SUGGESTED A NON-POLITICAL MANAGEMENT TEAM WHICH WOULD HAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS THE UN CIVILIAN FORCE WE ARE CONSIDERING FOR NAMIBIA. SUCH A GROUP WOULD HAVE TO BE OUTSIDERS, AND THE REAL QUESTION IS WHETHER MOBUTU CAN TOLERATE THIS KIND OF OPERATION. HE OBSERVED THAT MOBUTU HAS SHOWN SOME CAPACITY FOR FORGIVENESS, HOWEVER, AND NOTED A NUMBER OF FORMER PERSONALITIES WHO HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO REMAIN IN ZAIRE. HE SAID MOST OF THEM WERE A THREAT TO MOBUTU ONLY IN MOBUTU'S MIND, IN ANY EVENT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 USUN N 02280 01 OF 04 060033Z

3. ONE ASPECT OF THE ZAIRE PROBLEM, THEREFORE, REVOLVES AROUND THE INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS. A SECOND PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS THE USE OF ZAIRIAN TERRITORY TO ATTACK ANGOLA. HE REFERRED TO THE PROBLEMS POSED TO THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT BY THE EXISTENCE OF SOME 200,000 SHABAN REFUGEES IN ANGOLA. CONCERNING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RECENT ATTACK ON SHABA, YOUNG SAID HE INCLINES TOWARD THE EAST GERMAN RATIONALE WHICH GENERALLY HOLDS THAT THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAS LITTLE INCENTIVE OR CAPABILITY TO TAKE ON THE DISARMING OF THE KATANGAN POPULATION. YOUNG SAID IT IS FAIRLY CLEAR THAT ANGOLA AND THE CUBANS KNEW ABOUT THE KATANGA ATTACK PLANS, BUT HE BELIEVES THEY DID NOT MAKE THOSE PLANS.

4. YOUNG CONCLUDED THAT POURING MONEY INTO ZAIRE WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM UNLESS THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM BETWEEN ZAIRE AND ANGOLA ARE ALSO SOLVED. HE SPECULATED THAT NEITHER THE ANGOLAN NOR THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT MAY BE STRONG ENOUGH AT THE PRESENT TIME TO UNDERTAKE SETTLEMENT OF THOSE PROBLEMS ON A BILATERAL BASIS. IT THEREFORE COMES DOWN TO A QUESTION OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TRADING MUTUAL SECURITY FROM BOTH

THE KATANGANS AND UNITA.

5. SIMONET SAID HE HAS RARELY MET ANYONE WITH WHOM HE IS MORE IN AGREEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF ZAIRE. HE SAID THE BELGIANS' VIEW AT PRESENT IS FIRST, FOR THE TIME BEING THERE IS NO CHOICE BUT MOBUTU; BUT SECOND, THE MOBUTU REGIME IS NOT VIABLE. HE SAID IT THEREFORE IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT WE FORCE CHANGE ON MOBUTU. MOBUTU KNOWS THAT THAT IS THE UNAVOIDABLE CONCLUSION, AND HE DOES NOT LIKE IT. SIMONET REFERRED TO MOBUTU'S SPEECH IN NOVEMBER 1977, WHICH HAD A NUMBER OF SENSIBLE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 USUN N 02280 02 OF 04 060036Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----079622 060038Z /73

O 060015Z JUN 78

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1794
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 02280

EXDIS

SUGGESTIONS IN IT -- PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE THE BELGIANS HAD DRAFTED IT. MOBUTU FURTHERMORE SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK SOME OF THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD REFORM, INCLUDING REFORM OF HIS PERSONAL ENDOWMENT, ESTABLISHING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CENTRAL BANK, REVIEW OF THE BUDGET AND OTHER MATTERS. HE ALSO ACCEPTED THE IDEA THAT SOME OF THE MORE COMPETENT POLITICAL LEADERS WHOM HE HAD RAILROADED INTO OBSCURITY COULD PLAY MAJOR POLITICAL ROLES IN SOME OF THE REGIONS OF ZAIRE THAT WERE GIVING THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DIFFICULTY. MOBUTU ALSO ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE WHICH WOULD, OF COURSE, INCLUDE AS MANY

BLACKS AS POSSIBLE. ON ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS AND MANY MORE BESIDES, MOBUTU DID NOT RAISE ANY OPPOSITION. ON IMPLEMENTATION, HOWEVER, HE IS STILL, AS HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN, BALKY. FURTHERMORE, THESE TALKS WITH MOBUTU AND HIS FIRST REFORM STEPS WERE ALL TAKEN BEFORE SHABA II.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 USUN N 02280 02 OF 04 060036Z

MANY OF THE ACTIONS ALSO WERE STIFFLY RESISTED BY THE PEOPLE AROUND MOBUTU, WHO COULD SEE THAT THEIR SOURCES OF CORRUPT WEALTH WOULD BE CUT OFF. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH STRINGENT IMF CONTROL OVER ZAIRIAN CURRENCY, WHICH WOULD HAVE PREVENTED MANY ZAIRIANS FROM TRADING BETWEEN TWO EXCHANGE RATES.

6. SIMONET SAID MOBUTU FEELS CORNERED, AND WHEN HE IS CORNERED HE IS DANGEROUS. MOBUTU OBVIOUSLY WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE RESPONSES HE RECEIVED FROM THE MOROCCANS AND THE SENEGALESE. SIMONET SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PUT TOGETHER AN AFRICAN SECURITY FORCE FOR SHABA. THE AFRICANS FEEL THREATENED BY THE CUBANS, BUT THEIR ANSWER IS TO SEEK WESTERN MILITARY PRESENCE.

7. YOUNG SAID THAT FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE LOOK AT THE ANGOLAN SIDE OF THIS PROBLEM, AS WELL AS THE OBVIOUSLY CRITICAL PROBLEM WITHIN ZAIRE. OTHERWISE, WE WILL BE DRAWN INTO A CONFRONTATION ALONG EAST-WEST LINES WHICH WOULD BE DISASTEROUS FOR ALL OF OUR INTERESTS. SIMONET SAID HE AGREED COMPLETELY WITH THIS CONCERN. YOUNG ADDED THAT THE ANGOLAN ASPECT ALSO IS CRUCIAL TO OUR INTEREST IN A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA. WITH A SUCCESS IN NAMIBIA AND THEN POSSIBLY IN RHODESIA, WE MAY HAVE SOME HOPE OF ENCOURAGING STABILITY IN ANGOLA AND PERHAPS EVEN ZAIRE. WITHOUT SUCH PROGRESS WE PROBABLY ARE FACED WITH CHAOS. SIMONET AGAIN EXPRESSED FULL AGREEMENT WITH THESE VIEWS AND OBSERVED THAT HE WAS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER JORGE LATER JUNE 2. HE SAID IT IS A FUNDAMENTAL BASE OF BELGIAN POLICY THAT THEY NOT ISOLATE OR REJECT ANGOLA

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 USUN N 02280 02 OF 04 060036Z

AS THEY WORK AT THE ZAIRE PROBLEM. HE AGREED THAT PROGRESS OF THIS KIND INVOLVING ANGOLA IS THE BEST WAY TO ARRANGE THE DEPARTURE OF CUBANS FROM AFRICA. IT IS SOMEWHAT MORE DIFFICULT FOR BELGIUM TO PLAY THIS ROLE,

BECAUSE IT IS IN EFFECT ON THE FIRING LINE IN CENTRAL AFRICA. HE URGED THAT THE U.S., HOWEVER, CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO ARRANGE SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND ENCOURAGE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STABILITY IN ANGOLA AND ELSEWHERE.

8. YOUNG SUGGESTED THAT THE KATANGAN REFUGEE POPULATION IN ANGOLA MIGHT BE APPROACHED THROUGH AN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OF SOME KIND. OUTSIDERS PRESENT AMONG THE KATANGANS IN THE REGION FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AID PROGRAM WOULD BE ABLE TO MONITOR THEM AND PERHAPS ULTIMATELY LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR DISARMING THE KATANGANS. HE RECALLED THAT CUBAN VICE PRESIDENT RODRIGUEZ HAD SAID THE KATANGANS WERE SUCH A DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR NETO THAT HE MIGHT BE MOVED TO UNDERTAKE CERTAIN MEASURES AGAINST THEM.

9. TURNING TO THE MEETING CALLED BY THE FRENCH IN PARIS FOR JUNE 5, SIMONET SAID HE DID NOT EXPECT MUCH TO EMERGE FROM PARIS. THE AFRICAN PARTICIPANTS WERE ALL RELUCTANT. YET SECURITY IN SHABA IS THE SHORT TERM PROBLEM WHICH IS INESCAPABLE. FRANCE CANNOT TAKE OVER, BOTH BECAUSE OF AFRICAN ATTITUDES AND BECAUSE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE. A PERMANENT EUROPEAN FORCE FOR SHABA IS ALSO UNTHINKABLE. HE SAID THE BELGIANS WOULD BE FORCED TO COMPLETE THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHABA MILITARY OPERATION WITHIN THREE WEEKS, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN BELGIUM. HE SAID BELGIUM WOULD NOT REMAIN IN ZAIRE MILITARILY EVEN IF MOBUTU PLEADS FOR IT. THEIR WITHDRAWAL, HOWEVER, WILL

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 USUN N 02280 03 OF 04 060038Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----079645 060039Z /73

O 060015Z JUN 78
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1795
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 02280

EXDIS

NOT END BELGIAN EFFORTS TOWARD PSYCHOLOGICAL STABILITY IN THE REGION. THE REQUIREMENTS ARE SIMPLE: SAFETY FOR THE RETURN OF INTERNATIONAL MANAGERS TO OPERATE THE ECONOMY AND SAFETY TO PERMIT THE INITIATION OF A SERIOUS REFORM PROGRAM AT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL. HE SAID HE AIMS AT PARIS TO SHOW MOBUTU THERE IS NO WAY OUT: ALL POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND POSSIBILITIES OF LONGER TERM REFORM DEPEND IN THE FIRST PLACE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN SHABA. SIMONET SAID WE MUST RESIST MOBUTU'S PREDICTABLE EFFORTS TO DRAG ALL OF US INTO AN EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION.

10. YOUNG SAID THE STRONG OPPOSITION OF THE ANGLOPHONES IN AFRICA TO THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IDEA CAUSES THE DEEP CONCERN THAT THE ISSUE MIGHT SPLIT THE OAU AT ITS SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 USUN N 02280 03 OF 04 060038Z

SUMMIT IN KHARTOUM IN JULY. HE SUGGESTED THAT SOME WAY SHOULD BE FOUND TO PERSUADE THE AFRICANS THROUGH THE OAU TO BRING SUCH PROBLEMS IMMEDIATELY TO THE UN. WITH PROPER STANDBY FORCES PREPARED IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, THE UN COULD RESPOND TO SUCH REGIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING AND REMOVE FROM THE AFRICANS RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIVISIVE DECISIONS. IF IT TURNS OUT THAT THE ONLY NATIONS SUPPORTING THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE ARE THE FRANCOPHONES, EGYPT AND THE SUDAN, THEY MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO AGREE THAT THE OAU SHOULD CALL ON THE UN. YOUNG SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SET THE RIGHT TONE IN THESE FIRST MEETINGS TO LAY THE BASIS FOR OAU AGREEMENT. WITH SUCH OAU CONCURRENCE, THE OPPOSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA COULD BE OVERCOME. IN ANY EVENT THEY MIGHT VERY WELL PREFER A UN PEACEKEEPING EFFORT IN PLACE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE NOW BEING DISCUSSED, WHICH WILL BE PERCEIVED BY EVERYONE AS A FRENCH-CONTROLLED OPERATION. SIMONET ASKED THE PROBABLE ATTITUDE OF NIGERIA. YOUNG SAID THAT WHILE THEY APPEARED TO BE DOUBTFUL, THE RECENT BACKGROUND OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR AND THEIR CURRENT MEMBERSHIP ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL OFFER SOME GROUNDS FOR PERSUADING THEM. HE REFERRED TO A RECENT STATEMENT BY TANZANIAN PRESIDENT NYERERE WHICH PRAISED THE CUBANS FOR THEIR ROLE IN AFRICA. HE SUGGESTED THAT AFRICANS LIKE

EGYPT AND SUDAN SHOULD BE THE ONES TO PERSUADE NIGERIA AND TANZANIA TO SUPPORT THE UN IDEA. SIMONET URGED THAT THE U.S. WAS THE BEST ONE TO DO THE PERSUADING, WITH OUR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NIGERIA. HE THOUGHT THAT NIGERIA WAS MORE INFLUENTIAL IN THIS CONNECTION THAN TANZANIA. AMBASSADOR YOUNG EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT U.S. EFFORTS WITH NIGERIA MIGHT KILL THE PLAN RATHER THAN SELL IT. SIMONET INSISTED THAT NIGERIA WAS THE LOGICAL KEY ANGLOPHONE TO APPROACH ON THIS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 USUN N 02280 03 OF 04 060038Z

IDEA.

11. AFTER EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF THIS LONGER-TERM IDEA FOR APPROACHING THE AFRICAN AREAS OF CONFLICT, SIMONET SAID THE IDEA INTERESTED HIM GREATLY. HE CONCLUDED,- HOWEVER, THAT THE REQUIREMENTS IN ZAIRE MAKE IT IMPRACTICAL TO CONSIDER SUCH A LONGER-TERM APPROACH, BUT HE SAW NO REASON WE SHOULD NOT WK AT BOTH APPROACHES SIMULTANEOUSLY. A CRITICAL NEED IN SHABA WITHIN A MATTER OF WEEKS, HOWEVER, IS THE INSTALLATION OF AN EFFECTIVE INTERN INTERNATIONAL FORCE. OVER THE LONGER TERM HE INSISTED THAT NIGERIA IS THE KEY NATION AND THE U.S. SHOULD BE THE ONE TO UNDERTAKE AN APPROACH TO THEM.

12. RETURNING TO THE PROBLEM OF RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA, SIMONET SAID HIS GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO WORK HARD AT MAINTAINING THEIR CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE ANGOLANS. HE SAID HE WOULD BE GOING TO LUANDA WITHIN THE WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS.

13. YOUNG ASKED SIMONET'S ASSESSMENT OF FRENCH OBJECTIVES IN CENTRAL AFRICA. SIMONET SAID HE SIMPLY DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE FRENCH INTEND; HE MIGHT KNOW MORE IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO TALK WITH THEM. HE RECOUNTED IN LENGTHY DETAIL THE FRUSTRATIONS HE PERSONALLY AND THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT HAD EXPERIENCED IN TRYING TO COORDINATE THEIR SHABA EFFORT WITH THE FRENCH. IN THE END, THE ONLY DIRECT CONTACT HE WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH WITH DE GUIRINGAUD HAD COME IN A LAST-MINUTE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT, IN WHICH DE GUIRINGAUD INFORMED HIM THAT THE FRENCH WERE MOVING IN TO KOLWEZI THE FOLLOWING DAY. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE FORTHCOMING PARIS MEETING, IF IT ACCOMPLISHED NOTHING ELSE, WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SERIOUS, SEQUENTIAL CONVERSATIONS WITH THE FRENCH FOR THE FIRST
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 USUN N 02280 03 OF 04 060038Z

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 USUN N 02280 04 OF 04 060038Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----079648 060040Z /73

O 060015Z JUN 78

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1796

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAKAR

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 02280

EXDIS

TIME. YOUNG

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: GOVERNMENT REFORM, POLITICAL STABILITY, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978USUNN02280
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780235-0182
Format: TEL
From: USUN NEW YORK
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780689/aaaacyqv.tel
Line Count: 423
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: fc565e90-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2463808
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DISCUSSION OF ZAIRE WITH BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER - SIMONET SUMMARY: IN CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR YOUNG JU
TAGS: PDEV, MOPS, MARR, CG, BE, FR, US, (YOUNG, ANDREW), (SIMONET, HENRI)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/fc565e90-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014